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Abstract : 
The procedure for implementing any international treaty necessarily involves two steps. The 
negotiation phase which culminates in the signature of the treaty is followed by a ratification 
phase. This last phase is governed by a rule which determines how far the ratification process 
has to advance before the treaty can come into effect. The purpose of this paper is to analyse, 
using a game theoretical approach, the possible consequences of this minimum participation 
rule for the ratification phase and for the negotiation phase. I consider the case of 
International Environmental Agreements in which, during the negotiation phase, the different 
parties have to decide on the level of a global target and on how to share the efforts necessary 
to reach it.   
I use a cooperative approach to define what is called the threshold value (T-value). For a 
given coalition of parties, the T-value gives the expected outcome of the negotiation over 
sharing a global target, when the parties take into account the minimum participation rule. 
Given this T-value, I use a non-cooperative approach to determine which coalition will sign 
the agreement and what will be its global target. The minimum participation constraint has in 
fact no impact on the ratification phase because it is always better to refuse to sign rather than 
to sign and then refuse to ratify. However, I show that the minimum participation constraint 
can modify the outcome of the negotiation phase. Indeed, it plays a role in a mechanism 
which can be used by a coalition to signal its leadership commitment. I analyse the conditions 
under which, at the equilibrium, the leading coalition can provoke an expansion of the signing 
coalition. 
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When Martina Navratilova announced her retirement from tennis
a journalist asked her:
« - When you retire, will you still be involved in tennis? »
« - I will not just be involved, I am committed to tennis. »
« - What is the di¤erence? »
« - Think of ham and eggs.
The chicken is involved but the pig is committed. »
1 Introduction
Contrary to popular belief, international treaties are not negotiated, then signed
and then enter into force. The situation is, in fact, more complicated, partic-
ularly in the case of multilateral agreements. In accordance with the 1969
Vienna Convention on treaty law, the procedure for implementing any interna-
tional treaty must involve two steps. The …rst or negotiation phase culminates
in the signature of the treaty by the di¤erent parties. In the particular case
of the Kyoto protocol, for example, the parties had to agree on the amount by
which total greenhouse gas emissions should be reduced and to decide on how
to split the e¤orts necessary to achieve this amount. The second or rati…cation
phase requires the rati…cation by the appropriate national bodies who thus give
the o¢cial consent of each country to the agreement. When the agreement is
multilateral, there may be special requirements specifying what stage in the rat-
i…cation process has to be reached before the agreement enters into force. The
rati…cation phase is then governed by a minimum participation constraint which
plays the role of a threshold. Depending on the treaty in question, this threshold
is de…ned in very di¤erent ways: as a set of countries, a number of countries or
a percentage of the targeted polluting substances (cf. Barret (2003) pages 165-
195). Sometimes, the rule is a combination of the three. In the particular case
of the Kyoto protocol, two conditions had to be met before the agreement came
into e¤ect. The …rst rule was that at least 55 countries which originally signed
had also to have rati…ed. The second rule required that the countries which had
rati…ed must have accounted for at least 55% of the pollution produced in the
reference year (1990).
The rule governing the implementation of an international agreement is
therefore nothing other than the imposition of a threshold which must be met
before the treaty comes into e¤ect. The question I address in this paper con-
cerns the consequences of this minimum participation constraint or threshold
for the rati…cation phase and for the negotiation phase.
Such thresholds are often invoked in the literature on games of contribu-
tion to a public good, for example. It is argued there that they are incentive
compatible (see for example the mechanisms proposed by Bagnoli and Lipman
(1989), Palfrey and Rosenthal (1984), or the experimental evidence presented in
a survey by Ledyard (1995)). What the negotiators are seeking when they de-
cide on the rule which will govern the rati…cation phase is to induce the highest
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number of countries to participate in the agreement. In a book which describes
the negotiations leading to the Montreal Protocol on protection of the ozone
Layer, Ambassador Richard Benedick (1998) explains that the U.S. started by
proposing a very high threshold:
"There was concern that the United States could, in a situation analogous
to its unilateral 1978 action, …nd itself bound to the obligations of an "inter-
national" protocol while its major competitors were not. As a legacy of the
domestic debate, some U.S. agencies insisted on pushing for a proportion of
consumption of 90 percent or higher as the trigger for entry into force and other
actions."
But as a the result of the negotiation:
"An inevitable, and reasonable, compromise was struck in Montreal, provid-
ing that entry into force would require rati…cation by at least 11 parties, together
constituting at least two-thirds of estimated global consumption of controlled
substances as of 1986 (article 16)[...] Most observers believed that this would
provide a su¢cient critical mass to increase the pressure on any potential large
holdouts to join the treaty."
Indeed, in the political science literature, di¤erent arguments can be found,
to sustain the idea that the decision to ratify is, in part, driven by the actions
of other states: if other governments are ratifying en masse, governments have
an incentive to ratify as well (von Stein (2006)). An argument developed by
Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) is that at a certain "tipping point" in a norm’s
evolution, a "norm cascade" takes place, and once rati…cation becomes the norm,
states ratify in large numbers because of pressure from other states and non-state
actors. However, these di¤erent aguments do not take into account the simple
fact that the countries which have to ratify have already signed the agreement.
To say that they have to take a decision again about their participation when
they have to ratify amounts to saying that there is a strategic exploitation of
this two step procedure. Some countries may have an incentive to sign, in order
to encourage the others to do the same, whilst knowing that they themselves
will not ratify in order to free ride. Will they always do this? In the model
developed in this paper it will be the case that it is better not to sign rather
than to sign and not ratify.
However, when Benedick speaks about a pressure on any potential large
holdouts to join the treaty, this can be understood in a di¤erent way. This does
not necessarily refer to the rati…cation process but can concern the paticipation
in the …rst negotiation phase and signature. I will focus on the problem of
participation, analyzing the consequences of the minimum participation rule
during the negotiation. I will claim that, in the case of multilateral agreements,
the di¤erent parties take the rule of the rati…cation phase into account while
they are negotiating their contributions. The negotiators clearly understand
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that they can use the minimum participation constraint strategically. With
regard to the 90 percent proposal of the United States at Montreal, Benedick
(1998) says:
"Many observers feared that such a requirement could hold the treaty hostage
to Japan or the Soviet Union, which might then weaken the protocol by extract-
ing other concessions as a price for adherence."
Barret’s (2003) interpretation of this observation is that these countries could
exploit a pivotal position to increase their weight in the negotiation. He says
(page 319):
"So why was the two-thirds hurdle preferable to the 90 percent threshold?
There are, I think, two reasons. The …rst is that the 90 percent threshold
would have given bargaining power to the USSR and Japan. If the two-thirds
hurdle were satis…ed and the treaty entered into force, then it probably would
have been in the interests of the USSR and Japan to join [...] However, if the
90 percent threshold were not satis…ed, entry by the USSR and Japan would
decide whether the treaty entered into force [...] Hence, [these countries] might
have used the higher threshold to obtain concessions."
Therefore, he considers that the bargaining power of the di¤erent parties to
the negotiation is measured by their voting power, if we interpret the rati…cation
as a vote. However, if this were the case, the same argument should be applied
to the big CFC-consumers. The European Union and the United States had
the greatest bargaining power, in both respects. Did these two parties try to
weaken the treaty nevertheless? In fact the opposite was true, the U.S. and
the EU were considered as the leaders in the negotiation and their high …nal
contributions to the treaty do not support this argument.
My claim is that the di¤erence between the U.S. and the E.U. on one hand
and the USSR and Japan on the other hand was not that the latter had more
bargaining power than the former but that the U.S. and the E.U. were more
committed. The way in which the threshold is de…ned can be interpreted as
a signal about the degree to which the di¤erent countries are committed. Of
course, this depends on the kind of rule considered. When the minimum partic-
ipation rule is de…ned as a number of countries there is no way, for one country
or the other, to play a speci…c role and the threshold cannot be used as a signal
about commitment. At the other extreme, when the rule is a list of countries,
it is clear that these countries are committed to the agreement. In the case of
the rule used in the Montreal protocol or the Kyoto protocol there is a signal
but one which is noisy.
Another signal about a country’s commitment is its contribution to the
agreement. Heike Schröder was an o¢cial note maker during the negotiations
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of the Kyoto protocol. Commenting on the result of the negotiation about the
reduction commitments she reports that:
"With 8 per cent of 1990 levels, the EU retains its leadership commitment,
albeit on a very narrow margin. The US consented to a 7 per cent reduction
target, which is a substantial commitment given its increase in emissions since
1990 of about 23 per cent." (Schröder (2001) p. 79 and 80)
But what is the link between these two sorts of signals? In this paper I give
a game theoretical explanation of the e¤ect the existence of a given threshold.
I show that it can modify the result of a negotiation in terms of the di¤erences
between the countries’ contributions and also in terms of the level of partici-
pation. The intuition is the following. Once the countries which have rati…ed
satisfy the minimum participation constraint, the agreement is implemented by
those countries. At this point, the countries which will ratify later will bene…t
from this implementation by the others. Indeed, the cost of implementing the
agreement is much higher for the initiating countries1. If it is likely that one
country will be among the …rst to ratify, it is also likely that this country will
bear a higher cost in implementing the agreement. In other words, the leader-
ship commitment mentioned by Schröder can be understood in a literal sense.
As a consequence, such a country will enter into the negotiation with a generous
attitude.
If the interpretation I have given makes sense, we should …nd a relationship
between a country’s position with respect to the threshold rule (is it necessary or
not for example) and its involvement in the negotiation or its willingness to con-
tribute to the agreement. Unfortunately, the latter is very di¢cult to measure.
However, the Kyoto protocol constitutes a case which is interesting and unique
from this point of view. First, its minimum participation constraint is a rather
sophisticated double rule. The …rst rule which speci…es a number of countries
is the most common rule applied in environmental treaties. The second rule
which speci…es a volume of the polluting substances targeted is much rarer, and
it is even more unusual to have a combination of this rule with another rule.
As far as I know, the Montreal protocol is the only other environmental agree-
ment with a double rule of this sort (see Barret’s list (2001) pages 165-195 and
the site of the Environmental Treaties and Resource Indicators). Furthermore,
the Kyoto protocol had another characteristic, which is that the countries have
decided to …x not only a global target but also individual targets, called the
Assigned Amounts. These assigned amounts and the way they di¤er from the
global target can be considered as a proxy for the di¤erent countries’ involve-
ment in the negotiation. The 5.5% decrease of global greenhouse gas emissions
is shared in a very unequal way (see Table 1 in Section 2). For example, in
terms of its own emissions, the contribution of the EU (responsible for 24%
of total CO2 emissions) is -8%, the contribution of the US (36% of total CO2
1 See for example the paper by G. Heal (1993) in which he gives a cost side analysis.
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emissions) is -7% while the contribution of Russia (17.5% of total CO2 emis-
sions) is 0% and Australia, which is responsible for just a little more than 2%
of emissions can increase its pollution by 8 percent. Di¤erent justi…cations,
historical, technological, and so forth, for these inequalities can be found in the
environmental literature. However it is worth noting that the biggest polluters
which are necessary to reach the threshold, are the biggest contributors.
How can we analyze this ex-ante e¤ect of a threshold on the result of a
negotiation? Here, I adopt a cooperative approach. Cooperative game theory
proposes di¤erent tools, solution concepts, to share a worth or a cost based on
di¤erent principles. For example, the Shapley value is based on the principle
that each player is remunerated according to its incremental worth, that is,
to its contribution to the contribution of a given coalition. Then, for a given
player, her Shapley value is her expected incremental contribution, when it is
assumed that the di¤erent orders in which the partners join the coalition are
equally probable. The Shapley value has been proposed "to evaluate the players’
prospects"- Hart and Kurz (1983) p1047. Let me also quote Shapley (1953 p.
307):
"At the foundation of the theory of games is the assumption that the players
of a game can evaluate, in their utility scales, every "prospect" that might
arise as a result of a play. In attempting to apply the theory to any …eld, one
would normally expect to be permitted to include, in the class of "prospects,"
the prospect of having to play a game. The possibility of evaluating games is
therefore of critical importance."
The idea that a value can be interpreted as the expected outcome of a nego-
tiation has been explicitly developed by Hart and Kurz. Since then, there have
been di¤erent attempts in the non cooperative literature to prove what was orig-
inally just an interpretation: that the Shapley value can be considered as the ex-
pected outcome of a negotiation (see for example Perez-Castrillo and Wettstein
(2001) or Maskin (2004)). Indeed empirical studies had already corroborated
this interpretation (see for example Littlechild and Thompson (1979)). In this
paper, I will not try to propose a non-cooperative game to describe the negoti-
ation. I will adopt the cooperative approach keeping in mind the interpretation
that the value corresponds to an evaluation of players’ prospects.
Another important aspect of the interpretation of the Shapley value concerns
the weights of the di¤erent players in the negotiation. The value is de…ned for
a given cooperative game (N; v) and v (N ) is then the amount the players have
to share. In our speci…c framework v (N ) can be for example the cost of pol-
lution control and, in general, is the total cost of implementing the agreement.
The coalitional function v represents the contribution to this cost of every coali-
tion. However, it cannot re‡ect all the elements which could play a role in the
negotiation. These elements are incorporated in the weights that the di¤erent
players have in the negotiation. Kalai and Samet (1988) say that: "The weights
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should be determined by considering such factors as bargaining ability, patience
rates, or past experiences". In the Shapley value, everything is considered to be
incorporated in the coalitional function and these weights are therefore symmet-
rical. By contrast, a weighted Shapley value is de…ned for a vector of exogenous
weights. Kalai and Samet (1985) have proposed an axiomatization of the family
of weighted Shapley values. Hart and Kurz (1983) have proposed a coalition
structure value which represents the Shapley value players can expect when
they form coalitions. Intuitively, this is what the players can expect when they
form coalitions to increase their weight in the negotiation: "Our view is that
the reason coalitions form is not in order to get their worth, but to be in a
better position when bargaining with the others on how to divide the maximal
amount available." (p. 1052). In this paper, I will consider that the di¤erent
countries have di¤erent weights because some of them want to be leaders in the
negotiation. Whilst, in the coalition structure value, players form coalitions to
increase their weights in the negotiation, here countries form a leading coalition
to decrease their share of the gain or to increase their contribution to the cost.
Why should they behave in this way? Because, by doing so, they can increase
the level of participation, convincing additional partners to sign a more favor-
able agreement. This aspect cannot be understood in a cooperative framework.
In the second part of this paper, I use a non-cooperative approach to describe
the agreement formation.
In Section 2, I propose a simple environmental cooperative game with three
countries, to illustrate how the minimum participation constraint can modify
the expected outcome of the negotiation. The threshold value (T -value), which
is de…ned for any cooperative game and for any given threshold is then formally
presented in Section 3. The T -value is then used to represent the expected out-
come of an environmental agreement negotiation when a threshold govern the
rati…cation phase. Section 4 presents three di¤erent non-cooperative models of
agreement formation. In the simplest game the countries only have to decide
whether to participate in the agreement. A rati…cation phase is introduced in
the second game. It is shown that, under mild assumptions, the rati…cation
phase is always completed. In the third game a coalition can use the minimum
participation rule to signal its leadership commitment. Then, the T-value rep-
resent the situation in which the leading coalition is willing to contribute more
in order to provoke an expansion of the agreement. Section 5 concludes.
2 How should the e¤orts to reach a global target
be shared?
2.1 Who gets the best deal?
In economic theory in general and in cooperative game theory in particular, we
are used to analyse sharing rules. In real environmental treaties the problem is
more complex since the outcome of the negotiation is generaly a global target,
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a time table and various rules which are common to every party. However the
Kyoto protocol is particular from this point of view since it gives country-speci…c
targets. Therefore, it is possible to measure the di¤erent parties’ involvement in
the protocol comparing the di¤erent speci…c targets. In Table 1 it can be seen
that the biggest parties to the Kyoto protocol were assigned rather stringent
targets, whereas smaller countries got more lenient targets. The size of the
di¤erent parties is here measured by their volume of green house gas emmissions.
country gg emissions percent total target
Australia 448,71 0,026293337 1,08
Canada 663,39 0,038873074 0,94
Iceland 3,17 0,000185754 1,1
Japan 1351,83 0,079214018 0,94
New Zealand 65,66 0,00384752 1
Norway 52,78 0,003092782 1,01
Russian Federation 1951,81 0,114371417 1
Switzerland 51,5 0,003017777 0,92
Ukraine 577,18 0,033821373 1
United States 6614,85 0,387614456 0,93
EU25 5261,47 0,308309611 0,923
Figure 1 plots Country-speci…c targets in the Kyoto protocol against the
percentage of the parties’ total green house emissions. The relationship appears
to be decreasing.
This does not correspond to what the theory usually predicts nor to the
normal intuition in this kind of situation. The usual idea is that biggest players
get the best “deal” because their participation is essential if treaty is to enter
into force. Why does this interpretation of bargaining power not correspond
to what we observe in the case of the Kyoto protocol? In this Section, I will
use a cooperative approach to show how the minimum participation constraint
can modify the sharing rule. My claim is that, the de…nition of the threshold
necessary for a treaty to enter into force can be interpreted as a signal about
how committed di¤erent countries are to the treaty. In the case of the Kyoto
protocol, does the fact that the threshold was de…ned as a volume of pollution
produced mean that the biggest actors were more committed? We know that
the European Union played a key role (see for example the book by Gupta
and Grubb (2000) Climate Change and European Leadership). The case of
the USA is more controversial. The fact that they refused to ratify seems to
show a posteriori that they were not committed. However, as Schröder (2001)
explains in her report on the negotiations, the USA were rather active during
the discussion about the assigned amounts. She says (page 79):
"On 8 December, US Vice President Al Gore made a 12-hour trip to the
Kyoto Confrence where he instructed his delegation "to show increased negoti-
ating ‡exibility if a comprehensive plan can be put into place". This message
may have swayed US negotiators’ willingness to accept higher targets".
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Figure 1:
2.2 The Shapley value of the environmental game
To illustrate the ex-ante e¤ect of the minimum participation rule on the result
of the negotiation, I propose to consider an environmental agreement as a cost
sharing game. Let the set of players be a set of three countries N = f1; 2;3g ;
which want to decrease their total pollution: T P = 610 units by 10 percent.
This is what will be called the global target. Assume that the marginal cost of
decreasing pollution is decreasing, the cost of reducing pollution by R units is
C (R) =
p
R. Therefore, the three countries have to share a cost T C = 7:81.
At the outset, each country i generates a percentage of the total pollution T P .
Let us assume that each county’s pollution is, respectively, P1 = 360 = 59%T P ,
P2 = 160 = 26:23%T P; P3 = 90 = 14:75%T P: Given the 10 percent target, the
characteristic function of the sharing cost game is given as follows:
8S ½ N; c (S) =
s
10%
X
i2S
Pi
Therefore, c(S) represents the cost borne by coalition S when it decreases its
pollution by 10% on its own. Obviously, this cost sharing game is sub-additive.
For each country, the cost of reducing its pollution by 10 percent is smaller if the
other countries do the same thing. This simple characteristic function captures
the idea that cooperation of countries increases their e¢ciency in decreasing
pollution. The Shapley value for this game is, for each country, its expected
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incremental cost (expected IC), given that the orders in which the countries
join the coalition are equally probable. An order r is de…ned on the set of
countries N . The set of all possible orders is denoted by R(N ): For a given
order r 2 R (N ), each country i’s ranking is denoted by ri . The Shapley value
can then be calculated with the following Table:
Orders
…rst 1 1 2 2 3 3
second 2 3 1 3 1 2
third 3 2 3 1 2 1
Sum Shap. val.
Country 1’s IC 6 6 3.21 2.81 3.71 2.81 24.54 24:546
Country 2’s IC 1.21 1.1 4 4 1.1 2 13.41 13:416
Country 3’s IC 0.6 0.71 0.6 1 3 3 8.91 8:916
'1 (v) = 4:03 = 51:6% T C;
'2 (v) = 2:23 = 28:55% TC ;
'3 (v) = 1:48 = 18:95% TC
Note that the contribution increases with the country’s volume of pollution
but less than proportionally. Now, suppose that to each country is allocated a
reduction in pollution in proportion to its contribution to the cost. This gives:
Country 1’s pollution reduction: 4:037:8 360 = 31:93 = 8:86%:
Country 2’s pollution reduction: 2:237:8 160 = 17:46 = 10:9%:
Country 3’s pollution reduction: 1:487:8 90 = 11:6 = 12:86%:
Here again, note that the biggest country reduces its pollution by the smallest
percentage. This is a direct consequence of the cost fonction concavity. The
small country bene…ts much more from the cooperation of the big country than
the opposite. As a consequence, the big country has a higher bargaining power
and gets the better deal in the partnership.
2.3 Rati…cation Process and Thresholds
Now, consider that the game is modi…ed by the introduction of a rati…cation
process. Indeed, the decisions taken by the di¤erent countries’ delegates during
the international negotiation have to be approved by the national institutions.
Given this new process, di¤erent decisional mechanisms could be considered.
First, consider that the three countries sign an agreement in which it is
speci…ed that the signatories are committed to reach a target of a 10% decrease
of their total pollution emissions and which gives the rule which will govern the
rati…cation process. The rule says that the agreement will be considered to be
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rati…ed if and only if the countries which have already rati…ed meet a minimum
participation constraint. Furthermore, as soon as the agreement is rati…ed it
will be implemented by those who have rati…ed it. What does this mean? Once
the threshold is reached, the countries which have rati…ed and form a coalition
S negotiate the sharing of the e¤orts needed to reach their own common target.
I will call this an ex-post negotiation. The expected outcome of this ex-post
negotiation can be considered to be the Shapley value ' (cS ) ; but it depends on
the threshold level speci…ed in the rati…cation rule and on the order in which
the three countries ratify.
An extreme case is the case in which the agreement can only be implemented
if all the countries have rati…ed. Then, at the end of the rati…cation phase, the
three countries are exactly in the same situation as before (cf. sub-section 2.1)
and the outcome is the Shapley value ' (c), whatever the order in which the
countries ratify.
Now, consider another extreme case in which the only condition is that
Country 1, the biggest country, has rati…ed. Then, if it is the …rst country
to ratify, it will have to bear the biggest cost of v(1) = 6. If it is the second
country to ratify, after country 2 it will bear a cost '1 (c12) = 4:6, after country
3, '1 (c13) = 4:85: If it is the third country to ratify, its cost share is, as in the
previous case, its Shapley value.
When the agreement can be implemented as soon as the two bigest polluters
have rati…ed, two scenarii can occur. First scenario: countries 1 and 2 are
the …rst countries to ratify and the threshold is reached without country 3.
Second scenario: country 3 is the …rst or the second country to ratify and the
threshold is only reached when all the countries have rati…ed. We will denote by
T (¿ ) = fN;12g the set of coalitions of countries which can reach the threshold.
Thus, to each random order of rati…cation corresponds one or the other of the
two coalitions. In the …rst scenario countries 1 and 2 have to implement the
agreement without country 3. In order to do so, they decide to share the common
cost of decreasing their pollution by 10%: c(12) =
p
10%(P1 + P2) = 7:2 using
the Shapley value for their two person game. Their contributions are then:
T = fN; 12g ; …rst scenario
'1 (v12) =
6 + 3:2
2
= 4:6
'2 (v12) =
4 + 1:2
2
= 2:6
When it is country 3’s turn to ratify, then, its incremental cost is just c(123) ¡
c(12) = 7:81 ¡ 7:2 = 0:61. However note that, in the second scenario, in spite
of the threshold, the sharing rule will be ' (c) :
Now, consider the case in which the minimum participation constraint is not
de…ned as a coalition of designated countries but a percentage of pollution. For
example, if this threshold is ¿ ; 60% < ¿ · 65% both the coalition of countries
1 and 2 and the coalition of countries 1 and 3 can reach the threshold and
T (¿ ) = fN;12; 13g.
10
Then, there are three di¤erent scenari. In the orders r = (r1 = 1rst; r2 =
2nd; r3 = 3rd) or r0 = (r01 = 2nd; r02 = 1rst ; r03 = 3rd) countries 1 and 2 ratify
…rst and implement the agreement. Their contributions are:
'1 (c12) = 4:6 and '2 (c12) = 2:6:
In the orders er = (r1 = 1; r2 = 3; r3 = 2) and er0 = (r1 = 3; r2 = 1; r3 = 2),
countries 1 and 3 ratify …rst and implement the agreement. Their target is
C (13) = 6:7 and their contributions:
'1 (c13) = 4:85 and '3 (c13) = 1:85:
Lastly, in the orders br = (r1 = 3; r2 = 2; r3 = 1); br0 = (r1 = 2; r2 = 3; r3 = 1)
the agreement is only implemented when the three countries have rati…ed and
the contributions correspond to the Shapley value.
However, the sequentiality of decisions described here is not consistent with
what happens in the case of a real environmental agreement.
2.4 Putting the Cart before the Horse
In the case of a real environmental agreement, the sharing of the e¤orts necessary
to reach the global target is decided prior to the rati…cation process, before the
countries know which of them will be active …rst. Therefore, let us modify the
previous game as follows. The objective of the international negotiation is to
decide how to share the e¤orts needed to reach the global target, given that it
will be followed by a rati…cation phase. I call this an ex-ante negotiation. I make
two assumptions about the rati…cation process and the countries’ conjectures
about how it will go.
First, I assume that rati…cation always occurs. In the long term, all the
countries will have rati…ed. However, in our framework there is no explicit
representation of timing. The only aspect which matters is the order in which
the di¤erent countries ratify. This matters because a country is not in the same
position when it has to start the implementation of the agreement or when it
can join a group of countries which have already started. Of course this is only
true if there is a delay between the time the agreement enters into force and the
time at which the additional country rati…es. Therefore, the assumption is that
this delay is enough for the …rst countries to bear a higher cost of implementing
the agreement and for the additional country to bene…t from the decrease in
marginal cost.
The second assumption is with regard to the conjectures of the countries’
delegates who participate in the negotiation. I assume that the participants in
the international negotiation have no idea about the order in which the di¤er-
ent countries will ratify. This is not a strong assumption since the delegates
who participate in the international negotiation are not the same individuals as
those who participate in the national process of rati…cation. The delay between
the two phases is another justi…cation for this assumption. Therefore, all the
countries will ratify but the delegates do not know in which order and they
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attribute the same probability to each one of these orders. We can …nd di¤erent
arguments along these lines in the literature on political science.
However the negotiating parties know the rule which will govern the rat-
i…cation process. First note that, without thresholds the situation is similar
to that we described in subsection 2.1, where we presented the game without
a rati…cation process. The sharing rule decided during the international nego-
tiation is just postponed until the end of the rati…cation process. The same
thing is true if the threshold is so high that it can only be reached when the
three countries have rati…ed. Here, this means that the threshold ¿ is such
that ¿ > 75%T P . Therefore, in this situation the expected outcome of the
negotiation is the Shapley value ' (c).
The question is now to know what happens when a binding threshold is
introduced. Then, as we saw in 2.2, the outcome of an ex-post negotiation
depends on the order of rati…cation. Now, let us consider the expectation of the
outcome of the ex-post negotiation, given that the di¤erent possible orders of
countries ratifying are equally probable. My claim is that this is the outcome
of the ex-ante negotiation and this de…ne a value for the cooperative game
(N; c) and for the given threshold. I will denote by Á (c; T) what I will call the
threshold value. This value can be interpreted as follows: It is the delegates’
"prospects" in the ex-ante negotiation when the outcomes of what would be
ex-post negotiations are common knowledge. It does not mean that these ex-
post negotiations will occur. It means that the countries use what would be the
outcome of an ex-post negotiation as an argument in the ex-ante negotiation.
I will de…ne the T-value precisely in the following sections but let us see what
happens in our example.
The …rst case I will consider is the case in which the threshold is high. That
is when:
T = fN; 12g or 65% < ¿ · 75%;
In that case we saw in the previous sub-section that in the …rst scenario,
that is in two orders out of six, countries 1 and 2 contribute more than their
Shapley value, respectively, '1 (c12) = 4:6 > 4:08 and '2 (c12) = 2:6 > 2:23.
On the other hand, country 3 contributes much less than its Shapley value
c (123)¡c(12) = 0:61 < 1:48. In the other scenario the three countries contribute
their Shapley value. Therefore, the threshold value can be calculated as shown
in the following table:
Orders
…rst 1 1 2 2 3 3
second 2 3 1 3 1 2
third 3 2 3 1 2 1
Sum T -value
1’s S-value2 4.6 4.03 4.6 4.03 4.03 4.03 24.54 24:546
2’s S-value 2.61 1.1 2.61 3 1.1 3 13.41 13:416
3’s S-value 0.6 1.85 0.6 2 1.85 2 8.91 8:916
2 The Shapley value is calculated, for Country 1 in each given order.
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Á1 (c; ¿) =
4 ¤ 4:08 + 2 ¤ 4:6
6
= 4:25
Á2 (c; ¿) =
4 ¤ 2:23 + 2 ¤ 2:6
6
= 2:35
Á3 (c; ¿) =
4 ¤ 1:48 + 2 ¤ 0:61
6
= 0:99
Note that, in each given rati…cation order the global target is reached. However,
the contribution of country 3 which may be able to ratify after the implemen-
tation of the agreement is less than its Shapley value. Country 3 gains at the
expense of countries 1 and 2.
The second case is the case in which the threshold is at an intermediate level.
That is when:
60% < ¿ · 65% or T (¿ ) = fN; 12; 13g
Then, the threshold value is:
Á1 (c;¿ ) =
2 ¤ 4:6 + 2 ¤ 4:85 + 2 ¤ 4:08
6
= 4:51
Á2 (c;¿ ) =
2 ¤ 2:6 + 2 ¤ 2:23 + 2 ¤ 1:11
6
= 1:98
Á3 (c; ¿) =
2 ¤ 1:48 + 2 ¤ 0:61 + 2 ¤ 1:85
6
= 1:31
In that case, countries 2 and 3 gain at the expense of country 1. Country 1,
which always participates in the …rst implementation of the agreement, is the
biggest contributor.
In the last case Country 1’s participation is the only necessary condition
for the agreement to enter into force. The T -value is decribed in the following
table:
Orders
…rst 1 1 2 2 3 3
second 2 3 1 3 1 2
third 3 2 3 1 2 1
Sum T -value
1’s order value 6 6 4.6 4.03 4.86 4.03 29.52 29:526
2’s order value 1.15 1.15 2.61 2.23 1.1 2.23 8.24 8:246
3’s order value 0.65 0.65 0.6 1.48 1.85 1.48 6.71 6:716
Á1 (c; 1) = 4:92 = 63% T C;
Á2 (c; 1) = 1:37 = 17:58% TC ;
Á3 (c; 1) = 1:12 = 14:31% TC
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3 The T-value
3.1 Notation and de…nitions
In this sub-section, well known and new concepts and results which will be used
in the following Section will be presented. Some of them are new, others are
standard. Consider a set of players U: A coalition of players is a subset S ½ U:
A coalitional function game (U; v) is de…ned for a given coalitional function v,
which associates a worth v (S) to each coalition S ½ U . I will only consider coali-
tional function games which are superadditive, that is, for two disjoint coalitions
S and T ½ U , v (S) + v (T ) · v (S [ T). The incremental worth of player i to
coalition S; i 2 S is v(S)¡v(Sni). A null player is a player i whose incremental
worth to each coalition is zero: v(S [ i) ¡ v(S) = 0; 8S ½ U . A sub-set N ½ U
is called a carrier of game (U; v) if 8i 2 U nN; i is a null player. The property
of superadditivity captures an important characteristic of environmental agree-
ments. The interpretation of superadditivity is straighforward and this concept
is often used in the literature on agreement formation. Indeed, it is a common
idea that cooperation, generating synergies or externalities, can be represented
by a superadditive game. I will also use further below the following properties
of the coalitional function:
De…nition 1 The coalitional function game (U; v) is concave (convex) if, for
each player i 2 U,
v(T) ¡ v(Tni) · (¸)v(S) ¡ v(Sni); 8S ½ T; i 2 S
A coalition game is concave if, for each player, her incremental worth de-
creases when additional players are added to the coalition she joins. A value of
the coalition game (U; v) is a function which associates with each player i in U
a real number. For example, the Shapley value can be interpreted as a mutual
acceptable sharing of v(N ) when the players agree in the following principles:
1- Each player must be remunerated at the level of her incremental worth.
2- This incremental worth depends on the group she joins.
3- An average incremental worth must be calculated taking into account the
order in which the di¤erent players join the group. The di¤erent orders have the
same weight (or are equiprobable).
Formally, for every game in coalitional function form (U; v), the Shapley
value can be characterized by three very simple axioms (cf Shapley (1953)).
Axiom 1 E¢ciency and null player. If N ½ U is a carrier of game v; then:X
i2N
'i (v) = v(N )
Axiom 2 Additivity. If (U; w) is de…ned such that w (S) = v(S)+u(S); 8S ½ U
then:
' (w) = ' (v) + ' (u)
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Axiom 3 Anonymity. If ¼ is a permutation of U and ¼v de…ned such that
¼v (¼S) = v(S); 8S ½ U then:
'¼i (¼v) = 'i (v)
De…nition 2 8K µ U;8® 2 R; a unanimity game ®UK can be de…ned as
follows:
8S ½ U; v(S) =
½
® if K ½ S
0 otherwise
In an axiomatization proposed by Aumann (2005), Anonymity and Null
player are replaced by the following Axiom:
Axiom 4 8K µ U; 8® 2 R; 'i (®UK) =
½ ®
jK j ; if i 2 K;
0 otherwise
If N is a …nite carrier of game (U; v), the Shapley value for player i can be
calculated as her expected incremental value over all possible orders de…ned on
N , under the assumption that each order appears with the same probability:
8i 2 N;
'i (v) =
P
S½N;i2S (s ¡ 1)! (n ¡ s)! (v (S) ¡ v (Sni))
n!
For each coalition M ½ N , de…ne a coalitional function vM such that:
vM (S) = v (S \ M )
Then:
8i 2 M ½ N;
'i (vM ) =
P
S½M;i2S (s ¡ 1)! (m ¡ s)! (vM (S) ¡ vM (Sni))
m!
In this last case, 'i (N; vM ) is the value obtained by the members of coalition
M ½ N when they share v (M). Now, for each given coalition M ½ N; de…ne a
game (N;v¤M ), called the incremental game:
8S ½ N;v¤M (S) = v(S) ¡ vM (S)
Note that, if S ½ M , v¤M (S) = 0 and since the game is superadditive, v¤ (S) ¸
v(S). The Shapley value for each game (N; v¤M ) can be de…ned as:
8i 2 N nM;
'i (v
¤
M) =
P
S½N;i2S (s ¡ 1)!(m ¡ s)! (v¤M (S) ¡ v¤M (Sni))
(n ¡ m)!
=
P
S½M;i2S (s ¡ 1)! (m ¡ s)! (v (S [ NnM ) ¡ v (Sni [ NnM))
m!
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This is the value obtained by players in NnM; when they share what can
be called, by extension, their incremental value v (N ) ¡ v (M) : In other words,
this is the value which is calculated for each NnM -member, assuming that a
coalition M got its value v(M ) already and taking into account all possible
orders of players in NnM when they join the coalition M .
Example 1 An obvious case is that in which M is a singleton fig. Then,
'i
¡
vfig
¢
= v (fig) and 'i
³
v¤N ni
´
= v (N )¡ v (Nn fig) is player i’s incremental
value:
Example 2 Consider another case in which N = f1; 2; 3; 4g and M = 12:
Then,
'1 (v12) =
v (f1g) + v (12) ¡ v (f2g)
2!
and
'3 (v
¤
34) =
v (N ) ¡ v (Nn3) + v (123) ¡ v (12)
2!
The following Proposition proved in a companion paper (Thoron 2006) shows
that there is a general relationship between the Shapley values de…ned for a game
v; for the games vM ; and for the games v¤M . Consider Cm the class of coalitions
M ½ N; of the same size m:
Cm = fM ½ N : #M = mg
For each class Cm, the following relationship can be proved:
Proposition 1 Let N any …nite carrier of game v. For each given class Cm; m ·
n; the following relationship exists between the Shapley values de…ned for three
categories of games: the original game v, the games vM de…ned for each m¡size
sub-coalition M ½ N , and the associated incremental games v¤M :
'i (v) =
m!(n ¡ m)!
n!
264 X
M2Cm
i2M
'i (vM ) +
X
M2Cm
i =2M
'i (v¤M )
375
3.2 Heuristic approach
Following the usual heuristic description of the Shapley value, players have to
meet in a bargaining room to share the value of the grand coalition. They
arrive sequentially and the order in which they do so is determined by chance,
with all arrival orders equally probable. Each player, when she enters the room,
demands and is promised the amount which her participation contributes to the
value of the grand coalition.
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Here, I modify this description by introducing two rooms: the waiting room
and the bargaining room. The participants arrive sequentially and in a random
order in the waiting room. But there is nothing to share before the coalition
formed by the players in the waiting room has reached the threshold. When the
last player necessary to reach this threshold enters in the waiting room, the door
is closed from outside and the usual process is followed by the present players.
Players arrive sequentially and in a random order in the bargaining room. Each
player from the waiting room, when she enters the bargaining room, demands
and is promised the amount which her participation contributes to the value of
the coalition. For each coalition S ½ N; the value 'i (vS) represents what player
i 2 S can obtain in this negotiation.
When the waiting room is empty again, the door of the waiting room is
reopened and the remaining players arrive sequentially and go straight to the
bargaining room in order to demand the amount which their adherence con-
tributes to the value of the grand coalition. For each coalition S, the value
'i (v¤S ) represents what player i 2 NnS can obtain in this negotiation.
3.3 Characterization
Denote by r (N ) an order de…ned on the set of players. For a given order r(N );
each player i is associated with a ranking ri . For a given leading coalition L ½ N
and a given order r(N ); consider the coalitions S ½ N; which satisfy the three
following conditions:
(i) L ½ S
(ii) All the players who belong to coalition S arrive successively in r(N ):
given i 2 S; such that ri = M ink2Srk and j 2 S such that rj = Maxk2Srk ;
8k 2 S, rj ¸ rk ¸ ri. In other words, think about S as a block in the order
r(N ):
(iii) One of the S-members arrives …rst in the order. In other words
ri = M ink2Srk = 1.
For a given leading coalition L ½ N , to each order r(N ) corresponds a
unique coalition S; which satis…es the three previous conditions and has the
smallest number of members. But each coalition S may correspond to several
orders. This de…nes an injective but not surjective application from the set of
orders to the set of coalitions L = fS : L ½ Sg. Denote by ®S the number of
orders associated with coalition S, this is the number of orders in which the
S-members arrive in …rst position but among them the last to arrive is a L-
member. In other words, in the order r (N ) ; the threshold is reached when
the last L-member has arrived and all the players who have a smaller ranking
constitute coalition S, associated with this order. Note that as a consequence
of the injective application, we have:
P
S2L ®S = n!
Example 3 For each coalition S 2 T (¿ ), ®S = (n ¡ s)!s!: This is the number
of orders in which the S-members arrive in the …rst positions.
Example 4 If T (¿ ) = Cs,again ®S = (n ¡ s)!s! but in that case, the coalitions
in T (¿ ) of larger size do not correspond to any order.
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Given this de…nition of weights ®S ; S 2 L, we can de…ne the threshold value
as follows:
De…nition 3 For any …nite carrier N of game v and a leading coalition L ½ N ,
the T -value for each player i 2 N is given by:
Ái (v; L) =
P
S2L;i2S ®S'i (vS) +
P
S2L;i=2S ®S'i (v
¤
S )
n!
In a companion paper (Thoron (2006)), I proved that the T -value is charac-
terized by the following Axioms:
Axiom 5 E¢ciency and null player. If N is a carrier of game v; then
P
i2N Ái (v; L) =
v(N )
Axiom 6 Additivity. If w is de…ned such that w (S) = v(S) + u(S) then:
Ái (w; L) = Ái (v; L) + Ái (u; L)
Axiom 7 Anonymity. If ¼ is a permutation of U and ¼v de…ned such that
¼v (¼S) = v(S); then,
Á¼i (¼v; ¼L) = Ái (v; L)
Axiom 8 Transfer. For any given a unanimity game ®UK . For any given
L µ U :
If K µ L; Ái (®UK ; L) =
½ ®
jKj ; if i 2 K;
0 otherwise
If L µ K;
½
Ái (®UK ; L) = 0;8i =2 K;
Áj (®UK ; L) = Ái (®UK ; L) + Áj (®UK ; K) ; if i 2 L and j 2 KnL
This last Axiom is equivalent to the following Axiom:
Axiom 9 For any given K µ U; and ® 2 R;
If K µ L; Ái (®UK ; L) =
½ ®
jKj ; if i 2 K;
0 otherwise
If L µ K; Ái (®UK ; L) =
8><>:
®
jKj
jLj
jKj ; if i 2 L;
®
jK j
³
1 + jL jjK j
´
; if i 2 KnL;
0 otherwise
What is the meaning of these two last axioms? Note that, for a given unanim-
ity game ®UK , Ái (®UK ; K) = 'i (®UK). When the coalition which constitutes
the threshold is L = K, the T-value coincides with the Shapley value. Given
this, the Transfer Axiom shows how a smaller threshold modi…es the Shapley
value. In a unanimity game, all the players are identical and they are all nec-
essary to realize a worth. In that case, when there is no threshold to bias the
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sharing, the value is expected to be the equal sharing of v (K) between the K-
members (see Axiom 4 of the Shapley value). Then, when a smaller threshold is
introduced, it may attribute di¤erent positions to previously symmetric players.
In that case, the player who is above the threshold has a higher value than the
player who is below the threshold. Furthermore, the di¤erence between the two
values is just the value without threshold, that is the Shapley value. Therefore
Ái (®UK ; L), which is the share received by the members of the threshold coali-
tion L is also what they transfer to the non-member players. For example, if
2 ¤ jLj = jKj, the members of the threshold coalition transfer half of their share
to the non members.
A natural idea would be that the players who are below the threshold have
a kind of veto power since the sharing cannot be done without them. This
is misleading. In a unanimity game ®UK the K-members all have this veto
power. The worth ® cannot be realized without each of the K-members. In
fact, the threshold introduces an additional distinction. Remember that, because
the game is superadditive, for any coalition S it is always better to get its
incremental worth rather than its worth: v(K) ¡ v(KnS) ¸ v(S). Therefore,
even if all players in K participate in the sharing of v(K), there is a di¤erence
among them depending on their position with respect to the threshold. The
players who are below the threshold will not have the possibility to share an
incremental value v(K)¡ v(KnS) instead of a value v(S). One can say that the
players who are below the threshold are more committed to the sharing. They
will initiate the sharing. The last axiom measure the price they pay for this.
4 Non-cooperative models of agreement forma-
tion
4.1 Incentives
The purpose of the previous Section was to explain how a country can signal
its leadership commitment through the minimum participation constraint. The
question remains as to why a country should behave like this. Consider the
situation in which countries have the possibility to participate or not in an envi-
ronmental agreement. Consider that they anticipate that the expected outcome
of the negotiation will be the Shapley value. They also anticipate that the nego-
tiation will be followed by a rati…cation phase. In this framework, a sub-set of
countries may have the right incentives to sign and ratify the agreement. They
simply bene…t more from participating in the agreement than from the external-
ities from which they could bene…t by staying independent. We say in this case
that the coalition of countries is stable in the sense de…ned by D’Aspremont et
al. (1983). This is also equivalent to say that there exists a Nash equilibrium of
a simple coalition formation game in which the set of strategies is just binary
(see Thoron (1998)). As it is well known from the literature on the theory of sta-
ble cartels, the size of this coalition depends, of course, on the payo¤ function,
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but it is often rather limited. In other words, the stable agreement is "small".
However, as Carraro and Siniscalco (1993) have shown, an expansion of this
coalition can be induced through transfer and commitment. Transfer without
commitment is not enough since, if the transfer is e¢cient and provokes the
coalition’s expansion, then the countries which belonged to the initial stable
coalition may now have an incentive to leave and free ride to bene…t from the
larger externalities and to avoid bearing a higher cost. Therefore, Carraro and
Siniscalco propose the following mechanism: The countries belonging to the ini-
tial stable coalition commit to cooperate. Once this is done, they choose the
transfer in order to maximize the number of signatories:
1) transfers are self-…nanced, i.e. the total transfer must be lower than the
gain that the committed countries obtain from expanding the coalition.
2) the move to a larger coalition must be Pareto-improving, i.e. all countries
must be better o¤ than in the situation preceding the coalition expansion, and
better o¤ than in the case of non-cooperation. (cf. Carraro and Siniscalco (1993)
p 316).
The purpose of this Section is to give a formal framework for a similar mech-
anism. However here, it is assumed that the transfers are not direct monetary
transfers but endogenously emerge from the negotiation as a modi…cation of the
sharing rule. Indeed, this is the simplest way to organize these transfers. In
other words, the leading coalition is more "‡exible" in the negotiation. I assume
that the T -value is the new sharing rule when a leading coalition constitutes a
threshold. It represents this leading coalition’s willingness to organize a transfer
in order to make an expansion possible. Given this new sharing rule, the ques-
tion is to know which leading coalition will form and which expansion will be
possible.
There are two degrees of commitment: the strongest degree of commitment
is to send the signal that the country will be a leading country. The second
degree of commitment is, for a country, to say that it will participate but needs
to be subsidized. Some countries are willing to be strongly committed if and
only if other countries participate. They only sign the agreement and assume
the high commitment if the others sign also. The last possibility is just to refuse
to participate.
4.2 Coalitional function
First, I will consider a simple and aggregated game called game G which will be
used in the subsequent Sections as a benchmark. Consider a set of n countries
N = f1; :::; ng ; each one characterized by an amount of pollution yi; i 2 N;
in a status quo situation. The implementation of an agreement signed by a
subset of countries T means that they choose to reduce their pollution by a
percentage x 2 [0; 1] which maximizes their joint net bene…t. The net bene…t
is the increase of utility produced by the improvement of the environment less
the cost of decreasing pollution. Denote the joint net bene…t of coalition T by
PT
¡
x (yi)i2T
¢
in which x is a scalar and YT = (yi)i2T the vector of the di¤erent
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T -members’ pollution: Consider:
bxT = Arg max
x
PT
¡
x (yi)i2T
¢
; 8T ½ N
It is assumed that bxi = 0;8i 2 N: The following assumption A1 holds:
A1 : bxT · bxS if S ½ T; jSj > 1
Example 5 The following payo¤ function is often used in the litterature on en-
vironmental agreements (cf. for example Barret (1994), Ray and Vohra (2001),
Courtois and Haeringer (2005)...). Consider the symmetric case, yi = y = 1u.,
8i 2 N . A coalition of s countries sign an agreement to decrease their pollution
by x per cent. The individual bene…t of the aggregate abatment level xsy = xs
is:
Q
¡
x (yi)i2S
¢
= Q (xsy)
= axsy ¡ 1
2
x2s2y2 = asx ¡ 1
2
x2s2
The symmetrical cost of decreasing pollution is, for each one of the s countries:
C (xy) = C (x) =
c
2
x2
Where c is a positive parameter smaller than 4, c · 4. The percentage x is
chosen to maximize the aggregate payo¤ of the s countries:
PS
¡
xS (yi)i2N
¢
= PS (xsy)
=
µ
asx ¡ 1
2
x2s2 ¡ c
2
x2
¶
s
The solution is bxS = ass2+c . It can be easily checked that, when c · 4, that
is when the marginal cost is not "too high", @ bxS@s · 0 as soon as s ¸ 2 and
Assuption A1 is veri…ed.
Note that, A1 is consistent with another more traditional assumption which
is that the pollution abatment increases when the coalition expands. This will
be the property of superadditivity of the characteristic function V de…ned as
follows:
v (S) = bxS X
i2S
yi
The worth v(S) is the pollution abatment a coalition S would choose if its
members signed a binding agreement. Note that assumption A1 implies that
characteristic function v is concave: the incremental value of each country is
decreasing. This worth could have been de…ned as a partition function, depend-
ing on a coalition structure. However, it is assumed that only one coalition can
be formed. Implicitly, countries in N nS remain independent and, as speci…ed
above, do not decide any abatment. I will come back to this point below. The
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characteristic function V is assumed to be superadditive. Therefore, in particu-
lar:
A2 : 8S ½ N; 8T ½ S; v (S) ¸ v (SnT )
In a given coalition T , members share the joint bene…ts PT using a sharing rule
Ã (v) to decide about each country’s reduction. Therefore, ÃT (v) = (Ãi (v))i2T
is a vector in which Ãi (v) is the percentage applied to country i: The sharing
rule is assumed to be e¢cient :
A3 : ÃT (v) YT =
X
i2T
Ãi (v) yi = bxT X
i2T
yi = v(T )
As a consequence of superadditivity of v, we can write:
v(T ) = bxT X
i2T
yi ¸ bxT nj X
i2T nj
yi = v(T nj)
But, by Assumption A1:
bxTnj X
i2Tnj
yi ¸ bxT X
i2Tnj
yi
Therefore: bxT X
i2T
yi ¸ bxT nj X
i2Tnj
yi ¸ bxT X
i2Tnj
yi
When an additional country joins the coalition, the coalitional function is such
that the total reduction of pollution increases but the reduction by the initial
countries decreases. In what follows, we will see that, as a consequence, the
initial members bene…t from the new membership through two di¤erent ways.
The vector of status quo (yi)i2N is …xed. Then, the di¤erent countries’
payo¤s are denoted by ¼i±; 8i 2 N . From this situation, if one agreement is
signed by a coalition T; the T -members choose a pollution abatment v(T) and
share their e¤orts to reach this target using as a sharing rule the Shapley value:
' (v). Each T -member is then characterized by the bene…t function drawn from
the partnership:
8i 2 T : Pi (T; 'T (v))
Note that, in general, the maximization problem depends on what the countries
which have not signed the agreement do. This could only been represented by
a partition function. However here, this is not necessary since there is only one
agreement. The characteristic function is equivalent to a partition function in
which the countries in NnT are independent. The payo¤ of these countries
need to be de…ned nevertheless. The pollution reduction is an externality they
can bene…t from but of course they do not bear the same cost since they do not
implement the agreement. If country i does not participate in the agreement, its
bene…t from the implementation of the agreement by the T -members is denoted
by Qi (T; 'T (v)):
8i 2 N nT : Qi (T; 'T (v))
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Note that, this means that there is no strategic adaptation of pollution reduc-
tion by the non signatories (no leakage). The interpretation is the following:
countries which remain independent do not take into account the quality of the
environment. This is why they do not decide any reduction. On the other hand,
when other countries decrease pollution, they do not increase or decrease pollu-
tion as a best response. Simply, they do not participate in the abatment game.
However, this assumption is not determinant in what follows. It just makes the
model easier to write and to understand and do not a¤ect the results. Indeed,
we could write explicitly the abatment game between the signatories and the
non-signatories without changing the results. In fact here, a non-signatorie’ s
payo¤ is just a function of the pollution abatment induced by the signatories.
Therefore, it can also be written Qi (S; 'S (v)) = Qi ('S (v)YS ). The following
assumptions hold:
The game is essential: 9S ½ N : Pi (S; 'S (v)) ¸ ¼i± ;8i 2 S:
A4 Qi is an increasing function of the abatment:
If S ½ T; 8i 2 NnT; Qi (T; 'T (v)) ¸ Qi (S; 'S (v))
A5 For a given agreement T , the non signatories which do not bear the
cost of pollution reduction but can bene…t from it, have a higher payo¤ than
the signatories:
If i and j are identical but i =2 T and j 2 T; then Qi (T; 'T (v)) ¸ Pi (T; 'T (v))
4.3 Stable agreements
Consider the following agreement formation game called game G. Countries in
N have to decide to sign or not to sign an agreement to reduce pollution. For
each country i 2 N , its strategy is then denoted by: ¾i 2 f0; 1g. Each strategy
pro…le ¾ generates a coalition K = fi : ¾i = 1g of countries which sign and
implement this agreement to reduce pollution. Payo¤s are then determined as
in the previous section. A Nash equilibrium of this simple game ¾¤ generates a
'-stable agreement signed by the members of coalition K¤ = fi : ¾¤i = 1g. This
implies that coalition K ¤ satis…es the two well known conditions of internal and
external stability proposed by d’Aspremont et al. (1983) and which must be
written in this paper’s framework:
Coalition T¤ is internally stable if 8i 2 K¤:
Pi (K ¤; 'K ¤ (v)) ¸ Qi
³
K ¤ni; 'K¤ni (v)
´
Coalition T¤ is externally stable if 8i 2 NnK¤:
Qi (K¤; 'K ¤ (v)) ¸ Pi (K¤ [ i; 'K¤[i (v))
When the di¤erent countries are identical, that is when 8i 2 N; yi = y,
Q and P only depend on the number of countries which sign the agreement.
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Figure 2:
Then, the Shapley is the equal sharing and Qi (K¤; 'K¤ (v)) = Q (k¤) and
Pi (K¤; 'K¤ (v)) = P (k
¤) (see Figure 2).
Let us denote by NÃ the set of coalitions generated by a Nash equilibrium
of game G when the sharing rule is Ã. Then, the members of each one of
these coalitions will not have any di¢culty to sign the agreement. When the
game is symmetric, Thoron (1998) shows that this equilibrium always exists.
Furthermore, using the concept of Coalition Proof Nash Equilibrium (CPNE),
it is shown that this equilibrium is unique. The concept of CPNE is a re…nement
of Nash equilibria proposed by Bernheim, Peleg and Wilson (1987), which takes
into account coalition deviations and sati…es a property of consistency.
Theorem 1 Game G has one and only one coalition-proof stable cartel, which
is the greatest stable cartel.
4.4 Stable agreements with rati…cation phase
The previous game G is one shot: the countries decide symultaneously to sign
or not and the agreement is then implemented. Now assume that this one shot
game, which will be called the negotiation phase, is followed by a rati…cation
phase. In other words, the signatories have to con…rm their participation. This
two-step game will be denoted by Gr . Assume that each country is then repre-
sented by a team of delegates during the …rst negotiation phase and by domestic
24
institutions (now on DI) during the rati…cation phase. The outcome of the …rst
phase is a coalition T . The second phase of rati…cation is played by the domestic
institutions of the di¤erent signatory countries i 2 T . Therefore, each coalition
outcome of the …rst phase T ½ N de…nes a sub-game GrT in which the set of
players is T . Then, at each period t 2 [0; 1[, one country’s DI i 2 T is drawn
randomly which has to decide to ratify or not: ¾i = 0 or 1. Each country’s
DI try to maximize their country’s payo¤. Each period t is characterized by
a history ht which is just the coalition of countries which have rati…ed in the
previous periods. The rati…cation process is said to be over at period t if:
1- either ht = T; and the rati…cation process is said to be over and completed.
Payo¤s are then:
Pi (T; 'T (v)) ; 8i 2 T
Qi (T; 'T (v)) ; 8i 2 NnT
2- or ht is such that no country in Tnht wants to ratify. Payo¤s are then:
Pi
¡
T;'ht (v)
¢
; 8i 2 ht
Qi
¡
T; 'ht (v)
¢
; 8i 2 Nnht
In this second case countries in ht have to implement the pollution abatment
they had been assigned, although the result will not be what expected in the
agreement since some signatories will not participate in the implementation.
However, the countries are assumed to be farsighted and can anticipate the
rati…cation progress. But the outcome of the rati…cation process depends on the
order in which the countries in T are drawn. Therefore, even if the countries are
farsighted, generally they cannot know with certainty what will be their payo¤.
However, the following result shows that it is nevertheless the case, in speci…c
situations which are of particular interest. Countries cannot anticipate the order
of rati…cation, which is random, but they know the rule which governs the
rati…cation phase and determines when the agreement has to be implemented.
I will consider three cases, given a coalition T of signatories:
Rule RO : the agreement is implemented when the rati…cation process is
over.
Rule RU : the agreement is implemented if and only if all signatories have
rati…ed.
Rule RL: the agreement is completed if and only if, when the rati…cation
process is over, coalition L ½ T of signatories have rati…ed.
The rati…cation process is said to be always completed if it is completed in
each order.
Proposition 2 If T ¤ is '-stable, the rati…cation process is always completed,
whatever the rule of the rati…cation process is.
Proof. Assume that T¤ is '-stable, then:
Pi (T¤ ;'T ¤ (v)) ¸ Qi
³
T ¤ni; 'T ¤ni (v)
´
(1)
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The external stability condition is useless here. The rati…cation process must be
solved by backward induction.
Rule RO : The agreement is implemented when the rati…cation process is
over. Assume that ht = Tni: Then, country i rati…es if:
Pi (T ¤; 'T¤ (v)) ¸ Qi
³
T ¤; 'T ¤ni (v)
´
By de…nition and by Assumptions 1, the Shapley value, as an average of incre-
mental worths, is larger than the smallest incremental worth:
'i (vT ¤) yi ¸ bxT ¤ ³X i2T¤ yi´ ¡ bxT ¤ni
µX
j2T ¤ni yj
¶
and: bxT¤ni µX
j2T ¤ni yj
¶
¸ bxT ¤ ³X
i2T¤ yi
´
¡ 'i (vT ¤) yi
This implies, by e¢ciency of the Shapley value:
'T¤ni
¡
vT ¤ni
¢µX
j2T ¤ni yj
¶
¸ 'T¤ni (vT¤)
µX
j2T ¤ni yj
¶
Finally, by Assumption A4:
Qi
³
T ¤ni; 'T¤ni (v)
´
¸ Qi
³
T ¤; 'T ¤ni (v)
´
and since T ¤ is '-stable and veri…es (1), country i rati…es. If ht = T¤ni;j
country j can anticipate that if it rati…es, country i will also ratify. If it does
not ratify, the best situation for it would be that country i rati…es. However,
even if it is the case, for the same reasons as before, it is better for it to ratify.
Going backward, we check that for each history ht , each country i 2 T ¤nht has
always an incentive to ratify.
Rule RU : If ht = T ni country rati…es if the coalition of signatories is prof-
itable, that is if:
Pi (T ¤; 'T ¤ (v)) ¸ ¼i±
which is always satis…ed since T¤ is stable and Qi
³
T¤ni;'T ni (v)
´
¸ ¼i±.
Rule RL: If, when ht = T ni, the last country i 2 L; the conditions are
identical to RU . Otherwise, i =2 L and conditions are identical to RO . In both
cases the rati…cation process is always completed.
The previous proposition says that it is better to refuse to sign than to sign
and not ratify. Therefore, there is no strategic exploitation of the rati…cation
process. This is a consequence of Assumption 1: the pollution reduction imple-
mented by the other signatories and as a consequence the externality, is bigger
when it is the optimal reduction for them than when they expect an additional
reduction. Note that this proposition is a necessary but not su¢cient condi-
tion. Indeed, under rule RL; non stable coalitions can be followed by always
completed rati…cation process. Consider the following de…nition:
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De…nition 4 Coalition T is internally '-stable with respect to sub-coalition
S ½ T if 8i 2 S:
Pi (T; 'T (v)) ¸ Qi
³
T ni; 'Tni (v)
´
Under rule RL; any coalition M = L[K which is not necessarily Ã-stable but
is internally Ã-stable with respect to sub-coalition K would be rati…ed in every
order for the same reasons explained in the proof of the previous proposition.
An important consequence of Proposition 2 is that the rati…cation phase of game
Gr does not change the equilibria of game G.
Proposition 3 Whatever the rule of the rati…cation process is, the set of agree-
ments generated at the equilibria of game G coincides with the set of agreements
generated at the equilibria of game Gr .
Proof. Assume that T ¤ is '-stable in game G, then whatever the rule of the
rati…cation process is, it will be always completed and payo¤s will be:
Pi (T ¤; 'T ¤ (v)) ; 8i 2 T ¤ and Qi (T¤; 'T ¤ (v)) ; 8i 2 NnT ¤
If one country i 2 T ¤ considers deviating, it does not know anymore if the
rati…cation process will be completed. However, it knows that its payo¤ will be
at most Qi
³
'Tni (Tni; v)
´
: Therefore, it does not have any incentive to deviate
if:
Pi (T¤ ;'T ¤ (v)) ¸ Qi
³
T ¤ni; 'T ¤ni (v)
´
which is veri…ed since T¤ is stable in game G. Then T¤ can be generated by an
equilibrium in game Gr .
If T is not '-stable in game G, it cannot be generated by an equilibrium
in game Gr . Payo¤s when the rati…cation process is completed are the highest
payo¤s a country can anticipate when it considers a deviation. If this is not
enough because the coalition is not '-stable, the rati…cation process cannot
improve the incentive to sign. Indeed, it is not possible that more countries
ratify in coalition T ni than in coalition T:
Therefore, the introduction of a rati…cation phase does not have any im-
pact on the equilibria of the game. Indeed, under Assumption A1, the minimum
participation rule which governs this rati…cation phase has no impact on the
outcome. The rati…cation phase is always completed. What happens when As-
sumption A1 is not veri…ed? If the coalitional function V is not concave but
convex, indeed countries have an incentive to sign in order to increase their
partners’ contributions and then to refuse to ratify in order to free ride. In this
case the only rule which can guarantee completeness of the rati…cation process
is the unanimity rule RU . However if this was the case, the outcome would be
the grand coalition. It is much more plausible that, if the coalitional function is
convex when the number of participants is not too big, it becomes concave at
one point. When the coalitional fonction has a S-shape of this sort, a minimum
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participation constraint can indeed eliminate incentives to free ride when the
bene…ts of the partnership are below the level at which they become concave.
In what follows, consequences of the minimum participation rule on the
previous phase of negotiation are analysed. A new mechanism is introduced
in which, during the negotiation, the countries may decide to have di¤erent
degrees of commitment. Again, in the second rati…cation phase, they have to
sequentially con…rm their participation by ratifying the agreement.
4.5 Endogenous leadership
The following game will be called game Gl. The negotiation phase of game Gl
involves two steps. In a …rst step, the di¤erent countries have the possibility to
form a coalition which will be the leading coalition in the second negotiation step.
Being a leading coalition has two implications. First, in the second step, this
coalition L proposes an expansion to another coalition K using the T -value as
a sharing rule: Á (L [ K; v;L). Second, the rule for the rati…cation phase which
will follow is that the agreement will only be implemented if the L-members
have rati…ed.
4.5.1 Negotiation phase
The players are the n countries, N = f1; :::; ng (their delegates). In the …rst step,
each country i has to choose a leading coalition to which it wants to belong, its
set of strategies is:X1
i
= fL : L ½ N [ ?; i =2 L if and only if L = ?g
Given a strategy pro…le ¾1, a coalition L is feasible if 8i 2 L; ¾1i = L. The leading
coalition generated by the strategy pro…le ¾1 is then the feasible coalition with
the largest worth V (L). I changed the strategy sets in this …rst step. The idea is
that the formation of a leading coalition is not an open membership game but an
exclusive membership game. The decision to become a leading coalition, which is
willing to over-contribute is clearly a collective action. Then, in the second step,
the remaining countries in NnL decide to participate or not in the agreement.
Strategies are then de…ned like in the previous simple game G. For each country
i 2 NnL, its strategy is then denoted by: ¾Li 2 f0; 1g. To summarize, for each
country i 2 N and for the whole negotiation phase, its strategy is denoted by¡
¾ 1i ; ¾
2
i
¢
; in which ¾1i 2
P1
i and ¾
2
i =
¡
¾Li
¢
L½N;i=2L ; 8L ½ N; i =2 L; ¾Li 2 f0;1g :
The outcome of the negotiation phase is a pair (L; KL) :
L = arg max
©
v(L) : 8i 2 L; ¾1i = L
ª
KL =
©
i 2 N : ¾Li = 1
ª
4.5.2 Rati…cation phase
The rati…cation phase is described as in game Gr . Given that the outcome of
the …rst phase is a pair (L; KL) with M = L [ KL, the rule which governs
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the rati…cation phase is RL. Payo¤s are determined by the threshold value,
given that the leading coalition L constitutes the threshold. Therefore, if the
rati…cation phase is always completed, payo¤s are now:
Pi (M;ÁM (v; L)) ; 8i 2 M
and
Qi (M;ÁM (v; L)) ; 8i =2 M
From Proposition and the following discussion, we know that, given a pair
(L;KL) ; if M = L[KL is Á-stable, the rati…cation process is always completed,
whatever the rule of the rati…cation process is. Furthermore, under rule RL a
su¢cient condition is that M is internally Á-stable for sub-coalition KL:
4.5.3 Equilibria
In this subsection, the countries will be considered to be symmetrical: yi = y;
8i 2 N . In order to …nd the sub-game perfect Nash equilibria, game Gl must
be solved by backward induction. The previous result tells us that, if M =
L [ KL is internally Á-stable for sub-coalition KL, then the rati…cation process
by countries in M is always completed under rule RL. Then, if the rati…cation
phase is always completed, and given that the game is now symmetric, payo¤s
will be denoted by:
PKL (l + k;Á (v; l)) ; 8i 2 KL
PL (l + k; Á (v; l)) ; 8i 2 L
and
Q (l + k; Á (v; l)) ;8i =2 M
Note that assumptions A1 to A5 are still veri…ed. Compared with P (K; 'K (v))
the sharing rule Á (vL[K ; L) shifts PK (L [ K; Á (v; L)) up and PL (L [ K; Á (v; L))
down (cf. Figure 2). The curve Q (K; ' (v)) is unchanged since it only depends
on the total abatment and because sharing rule Á is also e¢cient, the total
abatment is unchanged: ÁM (vM ; L) YM = 'M (vM )YM = v (M). Therefore,
Q (M; ÁM (v; L)) = Q (M; 'M (v)) ; 8i =2 M .
For each leading coalition L ½ N , outcome of the …rst step of the negotiation
phase, we can determine a sub-game: GlL. In each sub-game GlL, there is a
coalition-proof Nash equilibrium of this sub-game and a unique coalition-proof
stable agreement, denoted by K¤L. Here, the only di¤erence is that the stable
coalition can be the empty set. Therefore, for each sub-game GlL, the equilibrium
is a coalition M = L [ K ¤L stable for the sub-coalition K¤L.
Consider the following strategy pro…le
¡
¾1; ¾2
¢
:
8i 2 N;
¾1i =
½
L; 8i 2 L
?; 8i =2 L
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Figure 3:
¾2i =
³
¾L
0
i
´
L0½N;i=2L0
such that ¾L
0
i =
½
1;8i 2 L0 [ K¤L 0
0;8i =2 L0 [ K¤L 0
Now, consider the …rst step of the negotiation phase. If no leading coalition is
formed, the outcome will be, in sub-game Gl? , the stable coalition L¤. Therefore,
countries whose strategy is to sign in the following step, may have an incentive
to become leaders in the …rst step if they can, doing so, increase partnership and,
as a consequence, their payo¤s. The following Proposition explains when this
expansion is possible. Depending on the characterization of the payo¤ functions,
there are three types of equilibria in game Gl.
Proposition 4 Let L¤ be the agreement formed at the equilibrium of game Gr .
At the equilibrium of game Gl:
1- No expansion is possible and the agreement formed is L¤ when:
K¤L¤ = ?; or K¤L¤ 6= ?; and PL¤ (L¤ [ K¤L¤; Á (v; L¤)) < PL¤ (L¤; ' (v)).
2 - There is an expansion from the leading coalition L¤ when:
K ¤L¤ 6= ?; and PL¤ (L¤ [ K¤L¤ ; Á (v; L¤)) ¸ PL¤ (L¤; ' (v)).
3 - The grand coalition is formed when:
Q (L¤; ' (v)) < P (N;' (v)) :
Proof. Consider that L¤is the agreement generated by the CPNE in game
G (under sharing rule ' (v)). If K¤L¤ = ? no expansion is possible from L¤,
which cannot be a leading coalition. Furthermore, the following inequalities are
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veri…ed:
Q (L¤; ' (v)) > PK (L¤ [ K; Á (v; L¤)) ;8K ½ NnL¤ (2)
Can another coalition be a leading coalition in this case? First, consider a
leading coalition L;L ½ L¤: Since no expansion is possible from L¤, even if an
expansion is possible from L, M = L[K ¤L cannot be larger than L¤. If a leading
member deviates from L, L¤ will be formed and the deviator will get at least
P (L¤; ' (v)) ; which is larger than P (M; Á (v; L)). Therefore, L; L ½ L¤ cannot
be a leading coalition at the equilibrium. Now, consider a leading coalition
L; L¤ ½ L: Assume that an expansion K ¤L is possible from L: Given M = L[K¤L :
PL¤ (M; Á (v; L¤)) < PL (M; Á (v; L))
However, there is always a K ½ N nL¤ such that:
PL¤ (L¤ [ K; Á (v; L¤)) ¸ PL (L [ K¤L; Á (v; L))
Therefore, from inequalities (1) and given that:
PK (L¤ [ K;Á (v; L¤)) > PL¤ (L¤ [ K;Á (v; L¤))
coalition L cannot be a leading coalition since each member has an incentive to
deviate:
Q (L¤; ' (v)) > P (L [ K¤L; Á (v; L))
If K ¤L¤ 6= ? and L¤ is a leading coalition. Then, if one leading country
deviates, choosing ¾ 10i = ?, the leading coalition is dismanteled. In the sub-
game Gl? the deviator becomes a member when L¤ is formed. Therefore, a
condition for strategy pro…le
¡
¾1; ¾2
¢
to be an equilibrium is, in this case, that
the expansion of the stable agreement is bene…cial for the leading countries:
PL¤ (L¤ [ K ¤L¤; Á (v; L¤)) ¸ PL¤ (L¤; ' (v))
If K¤L¤ satis…es this condition, the pair (L¤; K¤L¤) is generated by the CPNE of
the game Gl. If K¤L¤ does not satisfy this condition, L¤ cannot be a leading
coalition. There is no leading coalition and the agreement is signed by the stable
coalition L¤ formed at the second step.
Is there an equilibrium in which the leading coalition L is not initially stable
in game G (under sharing rule ')? There are two cases to consider.
First case: Q (L¤; ' (v)) < P (N; ' (v)). Then ¾1i = N; 8i 2 N is an equi-
librium of the …rst step and L = N . Indeed, any deviation by a country
eliminates the leading coalition and the stable agreement L¤ forms. The de-
viating country earns a payo¤ Q (L¤; ' (v)). Therefore, in this case, because
the countries have the possibility to form a leading coalition they can form the
grand coalition, even if the grand coalition is not stable under sharing rule ':
Q (L¤; ' (v)) < P (N; ' (v)) < Q (Nni; '(v)).
Second case: Q (L¤; ' (v)) ¸ P (' (N; v)). Consider a coalition L; L¤ ½ L.
Note that a L-member’s payo¤ is smaller than the payo¤ in the grand coalition,
since by de…nition and by assumption:
PL (M; Á (v; L)) < P (M; ' (v)) < P (N; ' (v)) ; 8L ½ N:
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Therefore, if a member of the leading coalition deviates, choosing ¾1i = ?, in
the following sub-game Gl? , L¤ is formed and the deviator can be independent
with a higher payo¤ Q (L¤; ' (v)).
The last result 3 about the formation of the grand coalition is just a con-
sequence of the sequentiality of the negotiation phase. The stable agreement
at the second step of the negotiation phase plays the role of a credible threat
during the …rst step in which the leading coalition is formed.
5 Conclusion
The purpose of this paper has been to analyse the role played by the min-
imum participation rule which governs the rati…cation phase of international
treaties. Whilst the literature has emphasised the consequences of this rule for
the process of rati…cation, I showed that it must have important consequences
for the outcome of the negotiation. Indeed, this paper sustains the argument
that negotiators do not anticipate a strategic exploitation of the rati…cation
phase. It is shown that, under a mild assumption which can be understood as
a concavity of the bene…ts drawn from partnership, the negotiating delegates
anticipate that the rati…cation phase will always be completed. However, I
showed that the minimum participation rule can be used to modify the result
of the negotiation. More precisely, when the rule is de…ned as a list of countries,
these countries can use this rule to signal their leadership commitment, and by
so doing, they can induce an expansion of the agreement. The price of this
leadership commitment, re‡ected in the T-value proposed in this paper, is that
the leading countries accept a distortion of the sharing rule at their expense, in
order to favor the adherence of additional partners.
The rule considered in this paper is a list of countries which must have rati-
…ed before the treaty can enter into force. This rule has been used in real inter-
national treaties. However other rules may be encountered. The most common
rule, which is just a number of countries, clearly cannot introduce any bias into
the negotiation. In this case, we may assume indeed, that the role of this rule is
to introduce a threshold. The latter will eliminate incentives to avoid ratifying
when the bene…ts of the partnership are below the level at which they become
concave. However, recently, more sophisticated rules have appeared,such as,
for example, the double rules of the Montreal protocol or the Kyoto protocol.
I did not analyse these sophisticated rules in this paper. However, what one
may conclude from this paper is that the basic minimum participation rule has
been progressively re…ned precisely because the negotiators use it, not only to
facilitate the rati…cation process but more directly as an instrument during the
negotiation to manipulate the outcome.
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